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Abstract
We consider the general model of zero-sum repeated games (or stochastic games with
signals), and assume that one of the players is fully informed and controls the transi-
tions of the state variable. We prove the existence of the uniform value, generalizing
several results of the literature. A preliminary existence result is obtained for a certain
class of stochastic games played with pure strategies.
Key words. Repeated games, stochastic games, uniform value, incomplete information,
single controller, Choquet order, Wasserstein distance.
1 Introduction
The context of this work is the characterization of repeated game models
where the value exists. We first consider here general repeated games defined
with finite sets of states, actions and signals. They contain usual stochastic games,
standard repeated games with incomplete information and also repeated games
with signals. At each stage the players will play a matrix game depending on
a parameter called state, this state is partially known and evolves from stage to
stage, and after each stage every player receives some private signal on the current
situation. We make two important hypotheses. We first assume that player 1 is
informed, in the sense that he can always deduce the current state and player
2’s signal from his own signal. Secondly, we assume that player 1 controls the
transitions, in the sense that the law of the couple (new state, signal received by
player 2) does not depend on player 2’s actions. We call “repeated games with
an informed controller” the games satisfying these two hypotheses.
This class of games contains Markov chain repeated games with lack of in-
formation on one side as studied in Renault, 2006, and is more general since, in
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particular, we allow here for transitions of the state depending also on player 1’s
actions. It also contains stochastic games with a single controller and incomplete
information on the side of his opponent, as studied in Rosenberg et al., 2004 (see
subsection 3.3.3 here). And a fortiori it contains the standard repeated games
with incomplete information on one side and perfect monitoring introduced by
Aumann and Maschler. Notice that repeated games with an informed control-
ler contains (weak) forms of the three main aspects of general repeated games
models : the stochastic aspect (the state evolves from one stage to another and
is controlled here by player 1), the incomplete information aspect (player 2 has
an incomplete knowledge of the state), and the signalling aspect (players observe
signals rather than actions). And we believe that the existence result presented
here is the first one to significantly deal with these three aspects simultaneously.
On the contrary, they do not contain stochastic games, where the transitions are
controlled by both players (see Mertens Neyman 1981 for the existence of the
uniform value in such games).
We prove the existence of the uniform value via several steps, and several
games are considered. These are : our original repeated game where player 1 is
informed and controls the transitions (level 1), an auxiliary stochastic game (level
2), and finally a one-player repeated game, i.e. a dynamic programming problem
(level 3). A crucial point is that in our original game, the set of states K is finite.
The auxiliary stochastic game has the following features. It is played with pure
strategies. The new set of states is X = ∆(K), the set of probabilities over K,
and represents in the original game the belief of player 2 on the current state1. In
the auxiliary stochastic game, the new state is known to both players, and actions
played are perfectly observed after each stage. It is also convenient to consider
states in ∆f (X), the set of probabilities with finite support on X . To express an
informational gap, we use the Choquet order of sweeping of probabilities : given
u and v in ∆f(X), we say that u is better than v, or v is a sweeping of u, if for
every concave continuous mapping f from X to the reals, u(f) ≥ v(f). And it
is essentially possible to model the original informational advantage of player 1
with a “splitting hypothesis” defined via this order. For the topological part, we
use the weak* topology on the set ∆(X) of Borel probabilities on X , and more
precisely the Wasserstein distance. This allows to carefully control the Lipschitz
constant of the value functions.
A dynamic programming problem can be derived from the auxiliary stochastic
game. The role of player 2 disappears, and the set of states of the dynamic
programming problem is Z = ∆f(X) × [0, 1]. ∆f (X) is dense in ∆(X) for the
weak* topology, so Z can be viewed as a precompact metric space. We define, for
every m and n, a value wm,n as the supremum payoff player 1 can achieve when
his payoff is defined as the minimum, for t in {1, .., n}, of his average rewards
computed between stages m+1 and m+ t. It is possible to prove that the family
(wm,n) is uniformly equicontinuous, and together with the precompacity of the
1The idea of considering an auxiliary stochastic game is certainly not new, see for example
Mertens 1986, Coulomb, 2003 or Mertens et al., 1994, Part A, Ch IV, section 3.
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state space this implies the existence of the uniform value for the the dynamic
programming problem. The proof of this implication can be found in a companion
paper (see Corollary 3.8, Renault 2007), which only deals with 1-player games
and can be read independently.
The present paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we consider a particular
class of stochastic games including our auxiliary games of level 2. We think this
class of games may be interesting in itself. It is defined with hypotheses making
no reference to the original finite set K, and we prefer to start by presenting this
class, which can be considered as both more general and simpler to study than
the auxiliary stochastic games. We prove that these games have a uniform value
using the result on dynamic programming proved in Renault, 2007. In section
3, we consider our original repeated game and show how the existence of the
uniform value in these games is implied by the existence of the uniform value
for the stochastic games of section 2. Finally, we obtain formulas expressing the
uniform value in terms of the values of some finite games. More precisely, let
vm,n be the value of the game where the global payoff is defined as the average
of the payoffs between stage m + 1 and stage m + n. We show in particular
that infn≥1supm≥0vm,n = supm≥0infn≥1vm,n, and this is the uniform value (see
subsection 3.3.1). We conclude by discussing several hypotheses and present a
few open problems.
2 A certain class of stochastic games
2.1 Model
We consider in this section 2-player zero-sum stochastic games with complete
information and standard observation, played with pure strategies. We assume
that after each stage, the new state is selected according to a probability with
finite support.
If X is a non empty set, we denote by ∆f (X) the set of probabilities on X
with finite support.
We consider :
• three non empty sets : a set of states X , a set A of actions for player
1, and a set B of actions for player 2,
• an element u in ∆f(X), called the initial distribution on states,
• a mapping g from X ×A×B to [0, 1], called the payoff function of
player 1, and
• a mapping l fromX×A×B to ∆f (X), called the transition function.
The interpretation is the following. The initial state p1 in X is selected according
to u, and is announced to both players. Then simultaneously, player 1 chooses
a1 in A, and player 2 chooses b1 in B. The stage payoff is g(p1, a1, b1) for player
1, and −g(p1, a1, b1) for player 2, then a1 and b1 are publicly observed, and a
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new state p2 is selected according to l(p1, a1, b1), etc... At any stage t ≥ 2, the
state pt is selected according to l(pt−1, at−1, bt−1), and announced to both players.
Simultaneously, player 1 chooses at in A and player 2 chooses bt in B. The stage
payoffs are g(pt, at, bt) for player 1 and the opposite for player 2. Then at and bt
are publicly announced, and the play proceeds to stage t + 1.
From now on we fix Γ = (X,A,B, g, l), and for every u in ∆f (X) we denote
by Γ(u) = (X,A,B, g, l, u) the corresponding stochastic game induced by u. For
the moment we make no assumption on Γ. We start with elementary definitions
and notations.
A strategy for player 1 is a sequence σ = (σn)n≥1, where for each n, σn
is a mapping from (X × A × B)n−1 × X to A, with the interpretation that
σn(p1, a1, b1, ..., pn−1, an−1, bn−1, pn) is the action played by player 1 at stage n
after (p1, a1, b1, ..., pn−1, an−1, bn−1, pn) occurred. σ1 is just a mapping from X to
A giving the first action played by player 1 depending on the initial state. Simi-
larly, a strategy for player 2 is a sequence τ = (τn)n≥1, where for each n, τn is
a mapping from (X × A × B)n−1 × X to B. We denote by Σ and T the sets of
strategies of player 1 and player 2, respectively.
Fix for a while (u, σ, τ), and assume that player 1 plays σ whereas player 2
plays τ in the game Γ(u). The initial state p1 is selected according to u, then
the first actions are a1 = σ1(p1) and b1 = τ1(p1). p2 is selected according to
l(p1, a1, b1), then a2 = σ2(p1, a1, b1, p2), b2 = τ2(p1, a1, b1, p2), etc... By induction
this defines, for every positive N , a probability with finite support on the set
(X × A × B)N corresponding to the set of the first N states and actions. It is
standard that these probabilities can be uniquely extended to a probability IPu,σ,τ
on the set of plays Ω = (X ×A×B)∞, endowed with the σ-algebra generated by
the cylinders (one can apply, e.g., theorem 2.7.2. p.109 in Ash, 1972).
Definition 2.1. The average expected payoff for player 1 induced by (σ, τ) at the
first N stages in the game Γ(u) is denoted by :
γuN(σ, τ) = IEIPu,σ,τ
(
1
N
N∑
n=1
g(pn, an, bn)
)
.
Definition 2.2. For u in ∆f(X) and N ≥ 1, the game ΓN(u) is the zero-sum
game with normal form (Σ, T , γuN).
ΓN(u) is called the N -stage game with initial distribution u, and corresponds to
the one-shot game where player 1’s strategy set is Σ, player 2’s strategy set is T ,
and γuN is the payoff function for player 1. It has a value if : supσ∈Σinfτ∈T γ
u
N(σ, τ) =
infτ∈T supσ∈Σγ
u
N(σ, τ). A strategy σ, if any, achieving the supremum on the LHS
is then called an optimal strategy for player 1. Similarly, a strategy τ , if any,
achieving the infimum on the RHS is then called an optimal strategy for player
2.
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Notations 2.3.
For p in X, we denote by δp ∈ ∆f (X) the Dirac measure on p. A probability u in
∆f(X) is written u =
∑
p∈X u(p)δp, where u(p) is the probability of p under u.
For u in ∆f (X), if ΓN(u) has a value, we denote it by v˜N (u) ∈ [0, 1]. For p in
X, if ΓN(δp) has a value, we denote it by vN(p) and we have vN(p) = v˜N (δp).
Notice that if p 6= p′, then δ1/2p+1/2p′ 6= 1/2 δp + 1/2 δp′, so we will not identify a
state p with the measure δp. When the value of the N -stage game exists for every
initial distribution, v˜N is a mapping from ∆f(X) to IR, whereas vN is a mapping
from X to IR. It is easy to see that : ∀u ∈ ∆f(X), ∀N ≥ 1, ∀σ ∈ Σ, ∀τ ∈ T ,
IPu,σ,τ =
∑
p∈X
u(p)IPδp,σ,τ and γ
u
N(σ, τ) =
∑
p∈X
u(p)γ
δp
N (σ, τ).
Claim 2.4. If vN(p) exists for each p in X, then v˜N (u) exists for every u in
∆f(X) and v˜N(u) =
∑
p∈X u(p)vN(p).
We now consider an infinite time horizon.
Definition 2.5. Let u be in ∆f (X).
The lower (or maxmin) value of Γ(u) is :
v(u) = supσ∈Σ lim inf
n
(infτ∈T γ
u
n(σ, τ)) .
The upper (or minmax) value of Γ(u) is :
v(u) = infτ∈T lim sup
n
(supσ∈Σγ
u
n(σ, τ)) .
v(u) ≤ v(u). Γ(u) is said to have a uniform value if and only if v(u) = v(u), and
in this case the uniform value is v(u) = v(u).
An equivalent definition of the uniform value is as follows. Given a real number
v, we say that player 1 can guarantee v in Γ(u) if : ∀ε > 0, ∃σ ∈ Σ, ∃N0, ∀N ≥
N0, ∀τ ∈ T , γ
u
N(σ, τ) ≥ v − ε. Player 2 can guarantee v in Γ(u) if : ∀ε > 0, ∃τ ∈
T , ∃N0, ∀N ≥ N0, ∀σ ∈ Σ, γ
u
N(σ, τ) ≤ v+ε. If player 1 can guarantee v and player
2 can guarantee w then clearly w ≥ v. We also have :
Claim 2.6. v(u) = max{v ∈ IR, player 1 can guarantee v in Γ(u) },
v(u) = min{v ∈ IR, player 2 can guarantee v in Γ(u) }.
A real number v can be guaranteed by both players if and only if v is the
uniform value of Γ(u).
Assume now that v˜N(u) exists for each N . If player 1 (resp. player 2) can
guarantee v then lim infN v˜N(u) ≥ v (resp. lim supN v˜N(u) ≤ v). As a consequence
we have :
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Claim 2.7. Assume that v˜N(u) exists for each N .
v(u) ≤ lim inf
N
v˜N(u) ≤ lim sup
N
v˜N (u) ≤ v(u).
So in this case, the existence of the uniform value v(u) = v(u) implies the exis-
tence of the “limit value” limN v˜N(u), and all notions coincide : v(u) = v(u) =
limN v˜N (u).
2.2 An existence result for the uniform value
We are interested in the existence of the uniform value, and are now going to
make some hypotheses on Γ.
Remark 2.8. We have in mind, in view of application in section 3, the case of
a repeated game with lack of information on one side where player 1 is informed
and controls the transition. In these games, there is an underlying finite set of
parameters K, and X is the set of probabilities over K. Initially, a parameter
k is selected according to p, and is announced to player 1 only. Then the para-
meter may change from stage to stage, but it is always known by player 1 and
its evolution is independent of player 2’s actions. It will be possible to check the
following hypotheses H1 to H7 in this model. Our point here is to be more general
and simpler. We want to be able to write a model without any reference to the
underlying set of parameters, and where players use pure strategies.
We first make the very important assumption that player 1 only controls the
transitions :
Hypothesis H1 : the transition l does not depend on player 2’s actions, i.e.
∀p ∈ X, ∀a ∈ A, ∀b ∈ B, ∀b′ ∈ B, l(p, a, b) = l(p, a, b′).
In the sequel we consider l as a mapping from X ×A to ∆f (X), and we write
l(p, a) for the distribution on the next state if the actual state is p and player 1
plays a.
Hypothesis H2 : X is a compact convex subset of a normed vector space.
We denote by ∆(X) the set of Borel probability measures on X , and we will
use on ∆(X) the weak* topology and the Choquet order. ∆f (X) is now seen as a
subset of ∆(X). We first fix notations and recall some definitions. We start with
the topological aspect : X is in particular a compact metric space, and we denote
by d(p, q) the distance between two elements p and q of X .
Notations 2.9. We denote by E the set of continuous mappings from X to the
reals, and by E1 the set of non expansive (i.e. Lipschitz with constant 1) elements
of E. For u in ∆(X) and f in E we write u(f) =
∫
p∈X
f(p)du(p). Given f in E,
we extend f by duality to an affine mapping f˜ : ∆(X) −→ IR by f˜(u) = u(f).
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In the following, ∆(X) will always be endowed with the weak* topology : a
sequence (un)n converges to u in ∆(X) if and only if un(f) −→n→∞ u(f) for
every f in E. ∆(X) is itself compact, the weak* topology can be metrized, and
the set ∆f(X) of probabilities on X with finite support is dense in ∆(X) (see for
example Doob, 1994, Ch.VIII, section 5, and Malliavin, 1995, p.99).
Remark 2.10. An important distance on ∆(X) which metrizes the weak* topo-
logy is the following (Fortet-Mourier-)Wasserstein distance, defined by :
∀u ∈ ∆(X), ∀v ∈ ∆(X), d(u, v) = supf∈E1 |u(f)− v(f)|.
One can check that this distance has the following nice properties. For every p,
q in X, d(p, q) = d(δp, δq). Moreover, for f in E and C ≥ 0, f is C-Lipschitz if
and only if f˜ is C-Lipschitz.
We will also use the convexity of X . In zero-sum games with lack of informa-
tion on the side of player 2, it is well known that the value is a concave function of
the parameter p : this fundamental property represents the advantage for player 1
to be informed (see for example, Sorin 2002, proposition 2.2 p. 16). In our setup,
we want the initial distribution δ1/2p+1/2p′ to be more advantageous for player 1
than the initial distribution 1/2 δp + 1/2 δp′. This is perfectly represented by the
following order :
Definition 2.11. For u and v in ∆(X), we say that u is better than v, or that v
is a sweeping of u, and we write u  v, if :
for every concave mapping f in E, u(f) ≥ v(f).
This order was introduced by Choquet2(1960). It is actually an order on ∆(X),
the maximal elements are the Dirac measures, and Choquet proved that the
minimal elements are the measures with support in the set of extreme points of
X (see P.A. Meyer, 1966, theorem 24 p. 282). For every f in E, we easily have
the equivalence :
Claim 2.12. f is concave if and only if f˜ is non decreasing.
We now define hypotheses H3 to H7.
Hypothesis H3 : A and B are compact convex subsets of topological vector
spaces.
Hypothesis H4 : For every (p, b) in X × B, (a −→ g(p, a, b)) is concave and
upper semi-continuous. For every (p, a) in X ×A, (b −→ g(p, a, b)) is convex and
lower semi-continuous.
We will prove in the sequel a natural dynamic programming principle a la
Shapley (or Bellmann).
2For convenience, we reverse here Choquet’s order, i.e. we write u  v instead of u  v. For
u and v in ∆f (X), a simple characterization of u  v will be stated later, see proposition 2.33.
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Notation 2.13. For f in E and α in [0, 1], we define Φ(α, f) : X −→ IR with :
∀p ∈ X, Φ(α, f)(p) = supa∈Ainfb∈B
(
α g(p, a, b) + (1− α) f˜(l(p, a))
)
.
Hypothesis H5 : There exists a subset D of E1 containing Φ(1, 0), and such
that Φ(α, f) ∈ D for every f in D and α in [0, 1].
Hypothesis H6 : For every (p, b) in X × B, (a 7→ l(p, a, b)) is continuous and
concave.
Hypothesis H7 : “Splitting” Consider a convex combination p =
∑S
s=1 λsps in
the set of states X , and a family of actions (as)s∈S in A
S. Then there exists a in
A such that :
l(p, a) 
∑
s∈S
λsl(ps, as) and infb∈Bg(p, a, b) ≥
∑
s∈S
λs infb∈Bg(ps , as , b).
H3 and H4 are standard and, by Sion’s theorem, will lead to the existence of
the value of the stage game. H5 is very important and will ensure that all value
functions are 1-Lipschitz. We will provide later a simple condition implying H5,
see remark 2.42 . H6 is the only hypothesis where the topology on ∆(X) appears,
and does not depend on a particular distance metrizing the weak* topology. H7 is
the generalization of the well known splitting lemma for games with lack of infor-
mation on one side. Under the hypotheses H1,..., H7, our main result in theorem
2.16 will be the existence of the uniform value. We will also obtain several other
properties, which will be expressed via the following notions.
Definition 2.14. A strategy σ = (σt)t≥1 of player 1 is Markov if for each stage t,
σt only depends on the current state pt. A Markov strategy for player 1 will be seen
as a sequence σ = (σt)t≥1, where for each t σt is a mapping from X to A giving the
action to be played on stage t depending on the current state. We denote the set
of Markov strategies for player 1 by : ΣM = {σ = (σt)t≥1,with ∀t, σt : X −→ A}.
Markov strategies for player 2 are defined similarly.
Definition 2.15. For m ≥ 0 and n ≥ 1, the average expected payoff for player
1 induced by a strategy pair (σ, τ) in Σ × T from stage m+ 1 to stage m + n is
denoted by :
γum,n(σ, τ) = IEIPu,σ,τ
(
1
n
m+n∑
t=m+1
g(pt, at, bt)
)
.
Theorem 2.16. Assume that H1,..., H7 hold.
Then for every initial distribution u, the game Γ(u) has a uniform value v∗(u).
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Every player can guarantee v∗(u) with a Markov strategy : ∀ε > 0, ∃σ ∈
ΣM , ∃τ ∈ T M , ∃N0, ∀N ≥ N0, ∀σ
′ ∈ Σ, ∀τ ′ ∈ T , γuN(σ, τ
′) ≥ v−ε and γuN(σ
′, τ) ≤
v + ε.
We have : v∗(u) = infn≥1supm≥0v˜m,n(u) = supm≥0infn≥1v˜m,n(u)
= infn≥1supm≥0wm,n(u) = supm≥0infn≥1wm,n(u),
where v˜m,n(u) = supσ∈Σinfτ∈T γ
u
m,n(σ, τ) = infτ∈T supσ∈Σγ
u
m,n(σ, τ), and wm,n(u) =
supσ∈Σinfτ∈T mint∈{1,...,n} γ
u
m,t(σ, τ).
For every m and n, v˜m,n and wm,n are non expansive, and (vn)n uniformly
converges to v∗.
2.3 Proof of theorem 2.16
We now prove theorem 2.16, and assume that H1,..., H7 hold. In the proof, we
endow ∆(X) with the Wasserstein distance. We denote by IN∗ the set of positive
integers. By H3 and H4, for every (p, a) ∈ X × A, the infimum is achieved in
infb∈Bg(p, a, b), and we will simply write g(p, a) for minb∈B g(p, a, b). For each p,
(a −→ g(p, a)) still is concave and upper semi-continuous.
Lemma 2.17. For every concave f in E and α in [0, 1], Φ(α, f) is concave.
Proof : Fix a convex combination p =
∑S
s=1 λsps in X , and consider for each s
an element as in A. By the splitting hypothesis H7, one can find a in A such that
l(p, a) 
∑
s∈S λsl(ps, as) and g(p, a) ≥
∑
s∈S λsg(ps , as). f is concave so f˜ is
non decreasing and f˜(l(p, a)) ≥
∑
s∈S λsf˜(l(ps, as)). We obtain :
Φ(α, f)(p) ≥ α
∑
s∈S
λsg(ps, as) + (1− α)
∑
s∈S
λsf˜(l(ps, as)),
=
∑
s∈S
λs
(
αg(ps, as) + (1− α)f˜(l(ps, as))
)
.
This holds for every (as)s∈S, so Φ(α, f)(p) ≥
∑
s∈S λsΦ(α, f)(ps). 
2.3.1 Value of finite games and the recursive formula.
Lemma 2.18. For every state p in X, the game Γ1(δp) has a value which is :
v1(p) = max
a∈A
min
b∈B
g(p, a, b) = min
b∈B
max
a∈A
g(p, a, b) = Φ(1, 0)(p).
v1 is concave and belongs to D. v˜1 is non decreasing and non expansive.
Proof : Fix p in X , and consider the game with normal form (A,B, g(p, ., .)).
By H3 and H4, we can apply Sion’s theorem (see e.g. Sorin 2002 p.156, thm A.7)
and obtain that this game has a value and both players have optimal strategies.
By lemma 2.17, we get that v1 is concave, and by H5, we have v1 ∈ D. By claim
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2.4, for every distribution u the game Γ1(u) has a value which is precisely v˜1. By
concavity of v1, v˜1 is non decreasing. Since v1 ∈ E1 and we use the Wasserstein
distance, v˜1 is non expansive. 
We will need to consider not only the n-stage games Γn(u), but a larger family
of games with initial distribution u.
Definition 2.19. Let θ =
∑
t≥1 θtδt be in ∆f (IN
∗), i.e. θ is a probability with
finite support over positive integers. For u in ∆f(X), the game Γ[θ](u) is the
game with normal form (Σ, T , γu[θ]), where :
γu[θ](σ, τ) = IEIPu,σ,τ
(
∞∑
t=1
θt g(pt, at, bt)
)
.
If θ = 1/n
∑n
t=1 δt, Γ[θ](u) is nothing but Γn(u). Γ[θ](u) can be seen as the game
where after the play, a stage t∗ is selected according to θ and then only the payoff
of stage t∗ matters. If θ =
∑
t≥1 θtδt, define θ
+ as the law of t∗−1 given that t∗ ≥ 2.
Define arbitrarily θ+ = θ if θ1 = 1, and otherwise we have θ
+ =
∑
t≥1
θt+1
1−θ1
δt. We
now write a recursive formula for the value of the games Γ[θ](u).
Proposition 2.20. For θ =
∑
t≥1 θtδt in ∆f (IN
∗) and u in ∆f(X), the game
Γ[θ](u) has a value v˜[θ](u) such that :
∀p ∈ X, v[θ](p) = Φ(θ1, v[θ+])(p),
= max
a∈A
θ1g(p, a) + (1− θ1)v˜[θ+](l(p, a)),
= min
b∈B
max
a∈A
θ1g(p, a, b) + (1− θ1)v˜[θ+](l(p, a)).
In Γ[θ](u), both players have optimal Markov strategies. v[θ] is concave and belongs
to D. v˜[θ] is non decreasing and non expansive.
Proof : by induction. If θ = δ1, lemma 2.18 gives the result.
Fix now n ≥ 2, and assume that the proposition is true for every θ with
support included in {1, ..., n − 1}. Fix a probability θ =
∑n
t=1 θtδt, and notice
that θ+ has a support included in {1, ..., n− 1}. Fix also p in X .
Consider the auxiliary zero-sum game Γ′[θ](p) with normal form (A,B, f
p
[θ]),
where f p[θ](a, b) = θ1g(p, a, b) + (1− θ1)v˜[θ+](l(p, a)). We will apply Sion’s theorem
to this game. By H3, A and B are compact convex subsets of topological vector
spaces. For every a, (b 7→ f p[θ](a, b)) is convex l.s.c. by H4. Consider now a convex
combination λa+ (1− λ)a′ in A. By H6, we have l(p, λa+ (1− λ)a′)  λl(p, a) +
(1− λ)l(p, a′). By the induction hypothesis, v˜[θ+] is non decreasing, so :
v˜[θ+] (l(p, λa + (1− λ)a
′)) ≥ v˜[θ+] (λl(p, a) + (1− λ)l(p, a
′)) ,
= λv˜[θ+](l(p, a)) + (1− λ)v˜[θ+](l(p, a
′)).
Since g is concave in a, we obtain that f p[θ] is concave in a. Regarding continuity,
by H6 and the induction hypothesis, (a −→ v˜[θ+](l(p, a)) is continuous. By H3,
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(a 7→ g(p, a, b)) is u.s.c., so (a 7→ f p[θ](a, b)) is u.s.c.. By Sion’s theorem Γ
′
[θ](p) has
a value which is :
v′[θ](p) = max
a∈A
min
b∈B
θ1g(p, a, b) + (1− θ1)v˜[θ+](l(p, a))
= min
b∈B
max
a∈A
θ1g(p, a, b) + (1− θ1)v˜[θ+](l(p, a)).
Consider now the original game Γ[θ](p), and a strategy pair (σ, τ) in Σ × T .
Write a = σ1(p), resp. b = τ1(p), for the first action played by player 1, resp.
player 2, in Γ[θ](p). Denote by σ
+
p,a,b the continuation strategy issued from σ after
(p, a, b) has occurred at stage 1. σ+p,a,b belongs to Σ, and plays at stage n after
(p1,a1,b1,...,pn) what σ plays at stage n + 1 after (p,a,b,p1,a1,b1,...,pn). Similarly
denote by τ+p,a,b the continuation strategy issued from τ after (p, a, b) has occurred
at stage 1. It is easy to check that :
γp[θ](σ, τ) = θ1g(p, a, b) + (1− θ1)γ
l(p,a)
[θ+] (σ
+
p,a,b, τ
+
p,a,b).
Consequently, in the game Γ[θ](p) player 1 can guarantee maxa∈Aminb∈B θ1g(p, a, b)+
(1−θ1)v˜[θ+](l(p, a)) by playing a Markov strategy. Similarly player 2 has a Markov
strategy which guarantees minb∈B maxa∈A θ1g(p, a, b)+(1−θ1)v˜[θ+](l(p, a)). Since
the two quantities coincide, Γ[θ](p) has a value v[θ](p) = v
′
[θ](p), and both players
have Markov optimal strategies.
This implies that for every u in ∆f(X), the game Γ[θ](u) has a value which is
the affine extension v˜[θ](u), and both players have Markov optimal strategies in
Γ[θ](u). v[θ] = Φ(θ1, v[θ+]) and v[θ+] is concave, so by lemma 2.17 v[θ] is concave,
and v˜[θ] is non decreasing. By H5 v[θ] is in D, so v[θ] is 1-Lipschitz, and finally v˜[θ]
is non expansive. 
Among the games Γ[θ](u), the following family will play an important role and
deserves a specific notation.
Definition 2.21. For m ≥ 0 and n ≥ 1, Γm,n(u) is the game with normal form
(Σ, T , γum,n).
Recall that in definition 2.15, we put γum,n(σ, τ) = IEIPu,σ,τ
(
1
n
∑m+n
t=m+1 g(pt, at, bt)
)
for each (σ, τ). So Γm,n(u) is nothing but Γ[θ](u) with θ = 1/n
∑m+n
t=m+1 δt. We
can apply the previous proposition and denote the value of Γm,n(u) by vm,n(u).
v0,n is just the value of the n-stage game vn, and for convenience we put v0 = 0.
We have for all p in X , and positive m and n :
vn(p) = Φ(1/n, vn−1) =
1
n
max
a∈A
min
b∈B
(g(p, a, b) + (n− 1)v˜n−1(l(p, a)) ) ,
=
1
n
min
b∈B
max
a∈A
(g(p, a, b) + (n− 1)v˜n−1(l(p, a)) ) ,
vm,n(p) = Φ(0, vm−1,n) = max
a∈A
v˜m−1,n(l(p, a)).
In Γm,n(u), the players first play m stages to control the state, then they play
n stages for payoffs. Moreover, player 2 does not control the transitions, so he
can play arbitrarily in the first m stages.
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Lemma 2.22. Fix n ≥ 1. There exists a Markov strategy τ = (τt)t≥1 for player
2 such that ∀m ≥ 0, ∀τ ′ = (τ ′t)t≥1 in T :
the condition (∀l = 1, ..., n, ∀p ∈ X, τ ′m+l(., ..., p) = τl(p)) implies that for
every u in ∆f (X), τ
′ is an optimal strategy for player 2 in Γm,n(u).
Proof : For each t in {1, ..., n}, define τt as the mapping which plays, if the
current state is p ∈ X , an element b in B achieving the minimum in :
min
b∈B
max
a∈A
1
n− t + 1
(g(p, a, b) + (n− t)v˜n−t(l(p, a))) = vn+1−t(p).
Using the previous recursive formula, one can show by induction that this construc-
tion of τ is appropriate. 
2.3.2 Player 2 can guarantee v∗(u) in Γ(u).
We now consider the game with infinitely many stages Γ(u). The following
results are similar to propositions 7.7 and 7.8 in Renault, 2006.
Proposition 2.23. In Γ(u), player 2 can guarantee with Markov strategies the
quantity :
infn≥1 lim sup
T
(
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
v˜nt,n(u)
)
.
Proof : Fix n ≥ 1, and consider τ1,..., τn given by lemma 2.22. Divide the set of
stages IN∗ into consecutive blocks B1, B2,..., Bm,... of equal length n. By lemma
2.22, the cyclic strategy τ ′ = (τ1, ..., τn, τ1, ..., τn, τ1, ..., τn, ....) is optimal for player
2 in the game Γnm,n(u), for each m ≥ 0. τ
′ is a Markov strategy for player 2, and
for every strategy σ of player 1 in Σ we have :
∀m ≥ 0, IEIPu,σ,τ ′
(
1
n
∑
t∈Bm+1
g(pt, at, bt)
)
≤ v˜nm,n(u),
so ∀M ≥ 1, IEIPu,σ,τ ′
(
1
nM
nM∑
t=1
g(pt, at, bt)
)
≤
1
M
M−1∑
m=0
v˜nm,n(u).
And since n is fixed and payoffs are bounded, we obtain that player 2 can gua-
rantee with Markov strategies : lim supM
(
1
M
∑M−1
m=0 v˜nm,n(u)
)
in Γ(u). 
This proof also shows the following inequality.
Lemma 2.24. ∀u ∈ ∆f (X), ∀n ≥ 1, ∀T ≥ 1, v˜nT (u) ≤
1
T
∑T−1
t=0 v˜nt,n(u).
The following quantity will turn out to be the value of Γ(u).
Definition 2.25. For every u in ∆f (X), we define :
v∗(u) = infn≥1supm≥0v˜m,n(u).
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Since v∗(u) ≥ infn≥1 lim supT
(
1
T
∑T−1
t=0 v˜nt,n(u)
)
, by proposition 2.23 player 2 can
also guarantee v∗(u) with Markov strategies in Γ(u). By claim 2.6, v(u) = min{v ∈
IR, player 2 guarantees v in Γ(u) }, so we now have the following inequality
chain :
v(u) ≤ lim inf
N
v˜N(u) ≤ lim sup
N
v˜N(u) ≤ v(u) ≤ v
∗(u).
2.3.3 Markov strategies for player 1.
By H1 player 2 does not control the transition, so a Markov strategy σ in-
duces, together with the initial distribution u, a probability distribution IPu,σ
over (X × A)∞, i.e. over sequences of states and actions for player 1. For u in
∆f(X) and σ1 : X −→ A, we denote by H(u, σ1) the law of the state of stage 2
if the initial distribution is u and player 1 plays at stage 1 according to σ1. We
denote by G(u, σ1) the payoff guaranteed by σ1 at stage 1. And we also define
the continuation strategy σ+.
Notations 2.26.
G(u, σ1) =
∑
p∈X u(p)g(p, σ1(p)), and H(u, σ1) =
∑
p∈X u(p)l(p, σ1(p)) ∈ ∆f (X).
If σ = (σt)t≥1 is in Σ
M , we write σ+ for the Markov strategy (σt)t≥2.
We now concentrate on what player 1 can achieve in Γ(u) and completely
forget player 2. We use similar notations as in definition 2.19.
Definition 2.27. For θ =
∑
t≥1 θtδt in ∆f (IN
∗), u in ∆f (X) and σ in Σ
M , we
put :
γu[θ](σ) = IEIPu,σ
(∑
t≥1
θt g(pt, at)
)
=
∑
t≥1
θt γ
u
[δt](σ).
For simplicity, we write γ[t] instead of γ[δt] for the payoff induced at stage t. Clearly,
we have for every t ≥ 2 :
γu[t](σ) = γ
H(u,σ1)
[t−1] (σ
+).
Lemma 2.28. γu[θ](σ) = minτ∈T γ
u
[θ](σ, τ).
The proof is easy, the minimum on the RHS being achieved by a Markov stra-
tegy τ such that for every t and pt, τt(pt) achieves the minimum in b of the quan-
tity g(pt, σt(pt), b). As a corollary of lemma 2.28, we obtain that supσ∈ΣM γ
u
[θ](σ) =
supσ∈ΣM infτ∈T γ
u
[θ](σ, τ). By proposition 2.20, Γ[θ](u) has a value, so we get :
Corollary 2.29.
For every θ in ∆f (IN
∗) and u in ∆f (X), supσ∈ΣM γ
u
[θ](σ) = v˜[θ](u).
As in definition 2.21, we now specify notations for a particular class of proba-
bilities.
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Definition 2.30. For n ≥ 1, m ≥ 0, u in ∆f(X) and σ in Σ
M , we put :
γum,n(σ) = IEIPu,σ
1
n
(
n∑
t=1
g(pm+t, am+t)
)
=
1
n
n∑
t=1
γu[m+t](σ).
Finally, we consider a situation where player 1 does not precisely know the
length of the game.
Definition 2.31. Fix m ≥ 0, n ≥ 1, and u in ∆f (X). We define :
wm,n(u) = supσ∈ΣM min{γ
u
m,t(σ), t ∈ {1, .., n}}.
The mappings wm,n will play an important role in the sequel, while applying
corollary 3.8 of Renault, 2007. We will show in corollary 2.38 that they are non
expansive. To prove corollary 2.38 we will use the following lemma 2.34 and
propositions 2.33, 2.35 and 2.36. We start by defining an auxiliary game3.
Definition 2.32. For m ≥ 0, n ≥ 1, and u in ∆f (X), we define A(m,n, u) as
the zero-sum game with normal form (ΣM , ∆({1, ..., n}), f), where :
∀σ ∈ ΣM , ∀θ ∈ ∆({1, ..., n}), f(σ, θ) =
n∑
t=1
θtγ
u
m,t(σ).
We will prove later that A(m,n, u) has a value which is wm,n(u) (see propo-
sition 2.36 below). Notice that in general f(., θ) is not concave in σ. However, we
will show that it is concave-like in σ, i.e. that : ∀σ′, σ′′, ∀λ ∈ [0, 1], there exists σ
such that ∀θ, f(σ, θ) ≥ λf(σ′, θ)+(1−λ)f(σ′′, θ). We start with a characterization
for the partial order .
Proposition 2.33. Let u and v be in ∆f(X). Write u =
∑
p∈X u(p)δp. The
following conditions are equivalent :
(i) u  v, and
(ii) For every p such that u(p) > 0, there exist S(p) ≥ 1, λp1, ..., λ
p
S(p) ≥
0 and qp1 , ..., q
p
S(p) in X such that :
∑S(p)
s=1 λ
p
s = 1,
∑S(p)
s=1 λ
p
sq
p
s = p, and v =∑
p∈X u(p)
(∑S(p)
s=1 λ
p
sδqps
)
.
The proof can be easily deduced from a theorem of Loomis (see Meyer, 1966,
T26 p.283), which deals with positive measures on X . Notice that condition (ii)
can be seen as follows : u is the law of some random variable X1 with values in
X , v is the law of some random variable X2 with values in X , and we have the
martingale condition : IE(X2|X1) = X1.
In general, γu[t](σ) is not a non decreasing function of u. However, we have the
following property.
3We proceed similarly as in section 6.2. of Renault, 2007. However the situation is more
technical here, and it will not be possible to apply a standard minmax theorem to the game
A(m,n, u).
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Lemma 2.34. Let n ≥ 1, u and v be in ∆f (X) such that u  v. For every
σ ∈ ΣM , there exists σ′ ∈ ΣM such that :
∀t ∈ {1, ..., n}, γu[t](σ
′) ≥ γv[t](σ).
Proof : by induction on n.
If n = 1, there exists σ′ such that γu[1](σ
′) = v˜1(u). Since v˜1 is non decreasing,
v˜1(u) ≥ v˜1(v) ≥ γ
v
[1](σ).
Fix now n ≥ 1, and assume that the lemma is proved for n. Fix u and
v in ∆f (X) with u  v, and σ in Σ
M . We have u =
∑
p∈X u(p)δp, and by
proposition 2.33 it is possible to write v =
∑
p∈X u(p)
(∑S(p)
s=1 λ
p
sδqps
)
, with λps ≥ 0,∑S(p)
s=1 λ
p
s = 1, and
∑S(p)
s=1 λ
p
sq
p
s = p for each p such that u(p) > 0. Define for every
such p and s, aps = σ1(q
p
s ). By the splitting hypothesis H7, for every p one can
find ap ∈ A such that :
l(p, ap) 
S(p)∑
s=1
λps l(q
p
s , a
p
s) and g(p, a
p) ≥
S(p)∑
s=1
λps g(q
p
s , a
p
s ).
We define what σ′ plays at stage 1 if the state is p as : σ′1(p) = a
p.
We have : γu[1](σ
′) =
∑
p u(p)g(p, a
p) ≥
∑
p u(p)
∑S(p)
s=1 λ
p
sg(q
p
s , a
p
s) = γ
v
[1](σ),
and H(u, σ′1) =
∑
p u(p)l(p, a
p) 
∑
p u(p)
∑S(p)
s=1 λ
p
s l(q
p
s , a
p
s) = H(v, σ1).
Since H(u, σ′1)  H(v, σ1), we apply the induction hypothesis to the continua-
tion strategy σ+. We obtain the existence of some Markov strategy τ = (τt)t≥1
such that : ∀t ∈ {1, ..., n}, γ
H(u,σ′1)
[t] (τ) ≥ γ
H(v,σ1)
[t] (σ
+). Define σ′t = τt−1 for
each t ≥ 2. σ′ = (σ′t)t≥1 is a Markov strategy for player 1, and satisfies :
γu[1](σ
′) ≥ γv[1](σ), and for t ∈ {2, ..., n+ 1} :
γu[t](σ
′) = γ
H(u,σ′1)
[t−1] (σ
′+) ≥ γ
H(v,σ1)
[t−1] (σ
+) = γv[t](σ). 
Lemma 2.34 is now improved.
Proposition 2.35. Let n ≥ 1, λ ∈ [0, 1], u, u′ and u′′ in ∆f (X) be such that
u  λu′ + (1− λ)u′′. For every σ′ and σ′′ in ΣM , there exists σ ∈ ΣM such that :
∀t ∈ {1, ..., n}, γu[t](σ) ≥ λγ
u′
[t](σ
′) + (1− λ)γu
′′
[t] (σ
′′).
Proof : by induction on n.
If n = 1, there exists σ such that γu[1](σ) = v˜1(u) ≥ v˜1(λu
′ + (1 − λ)u′′)
= λv˜1(u
′) + (1− λ)v˜1(u
′′) ≥ λγu
′
[1](σ
′) + (1− λ)γu
′′
[1] (σ
′′).
Assume the proposition is proved for some n ≥ 1, and fix u, u′, u′′, λ, σ′ and
σ′′ with u  λu′+(1−λ)u′′. Write v = λu′+(1−λ)u′′. By lemma 2.34 it is enough
to find σ in ΣM such that : ∀t ∈ {1, ..., n+1}, γv[t](σ) ≥ λγ
u′
[t](σ
′)+ (1−λ)γu
′′
[t] (σ
′′).
We have v =
∑
p (λu
′(p) + (1− λ)u′′(p)) δp, and v(p) = λu
′(p) + (1− λ)u′′(p)
for each p. For every p such that v(p) > 0, we define :
σ1(p) =
λu′(p)
v(p)
σ′1(p) +
(1− λ)u′′(p)
v(p)
σ′′1 (p).
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σ1(p) belongs to A by convexity. Now,
λγu
′
[1](σ
′) + (1− λ)γu
′′
[1] (σ
′′) = λ
∑
p
u′(p)g(p, σ′1(p)) + (1− λ)
∑
p
u′′(p)g(p, σ′′1(p))
=
∑
p
v(p)
(
λu′(p)
v(p)
g(p, σ′1(p)) +
(1− λ)u′′(p)
v(p)
g(p, σ′′1(p))
)
≤
∑
p
v(p) g(p, σ1(p)) = γ
v
[1](σ),
where the inequality comes from the concavity of g in the variable a (see H4).
Proceeding in the same way with distributions on the second state, we obtain via
the concavity of l in a (see H6) :
λH(u′, σ′1) + (1− λ)H(u
′′, σ′′1) = λ
∑
p
u′(p)l(p, σ′1(p)) + (1− λ)
∑
p
u′′(p)l(p, σ′′1 (p))
=
∑
p
v(p)
(
λu′(p)
v(p)
l(p, σ′1(p)) +
(1− λ)u′′(p)
v(p)
l(p, σ′′1(p))
)

∑
p
v(p) l(p, σ1(p)) = H(v, σ)
Consequently, we have H(v, σ)  λH(u′, σ′1)+(1−λ)H(u
′′, σ′′1), and by the induc-
tion hypothesis there exists σ+ in ΣM such that ∀t ∈ {1, ..., n}, γ
H(v,σ1)
[t] (σ
+) ≥
λγ
H(u′,σ′1)
[t] (σ
′+) + (1 − λ)γ
H(u′′,σ′′1 )
[t] (σ
′′+). We naturally define σ = (σ1, σ
+), and
we have, for t ∈ {2, ..., n + 1} : γv[t](σ) = γ
H(v,σ1)
[t−1] (σ
+) ≥ λγ
H(u′,σ′1)
[t−1] (σ
′+) + (1 −
λ)γ
H(u′′,σ′′1 )
[t−1] (σ
′′+) = λγu
′
[t](σ
′) + (1− λ)γu
′′
[t] (σ
′′). 
Proposition 2.36. For every m ≥ 0, n ≥ 1 and u in ∆f(X), the game A(m,n, u)
has a value which is wm,n(u).
Proof : Recall that the payoff function in A(m,n, u) is : f(σ, θ) =
∑n
t=1 θtγ
u
m,t(σ)
for every σ in ΣM and θ in ∆({1, ..., n}).
∆({1, ..., n}) is convex and compact, and f is affine continuous in θ. We
now show that f is concave-like in σ. Let σ′, σ′′ be in ΣM , and λ ∈ [0, 1]. By
the previous proposition, there exists σ in ΣM such that : ∀t ∈ {1, ..., m +
n}, γu[t](σ) ≥ λγ
u
[t](σ
′) + (1 − λ)γu[t](σ
′′). So f(σ, θ) =
∑n
t=1
θt
t
∑t
t′=1 γ
u
[m+t′](σ) ≥∑n
t=1
θt
t
∑t
t′=1
(
λγu[m+t′](σ
′) + (1− λ)γu[m+t′](σ
′′)
)
= λf(σ′, θ)+(1−λ)f(σ′′, θ). By
a theorem of Fan (1953, see proposition A.13 p.160 in Sorin 2002), A(m,n, u) has
a value which is : supσ∈ΣM infθ∈∆({1,...,n})f(σ, θ) = wm,n(u). 
Notation 2.37. For θ =
∑n
t=1 θtδt ∈ ∆({1, ..., n}), and m ≥ 0, we define θ
m,n
in ∆({1, ..., m+ n}) by :
θm,ns = 0 if s ≤ m, and θ
m,n
s =
∑n
t=s−m
θt
t
if m < s ≤ n+m.
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Corollary 2.38. For every m ≥ 0, n ≥ 1 and u in ∆f (X),
wm,n(u) = infθ∈∆({1,...,n})v˜[θm,n](u).
The mapping wm,n is non decreasing and non expansive.
Proof : Fixm, n and u. wm,n(u) is the value of A(m,n, u), so we have : wm,n(u) =
infθ∈∆({1,...,n})supσ∈ΣMf(σ, θ). But f(σ, θ) =
∑n
t=1 θtγ
u
m,t(σ) = γ
u
[θm,n](σ). So we ob-
tain : wm,n(u) = infθ∈∆({1,....,n})supσ∈ΣMγ
u
[θm,n](σ). Corollary 2.29 gives wm,n(u) =
infθ∈∆({1,....,n})v˜[θm,n](u). For each θ, v˜[θm,n] is non decreasing and non expansive by
proposition 2.20, hence the result. 
2.3.4 A dynamic programming problem.
We will conclude the proof of theorem 2.16 and show that the uniform value
exists. Fix the initial distribution u, our stochastic game is defined by Γ(u) =
(X,A,B, g, l, u). We now define an auxiliary MDP as follows.
Definition 2.39. The MDP Ψ(z0) is defined as (Z, F, r, z0), where :
• Z = ∆f (X)× [0, 1] is the set of states of the MDP,
• z0 = (u, 0) is the initial state in Z,
• r is the payoff function from Z to [0, 1] defined by r(u, y) = y for each (u, y) in
Z,
• and the transition function F is the correspondence from Z to Z such that :
∀z = (u, y) ∈ Z,
F (z) =
{(∑
p∈X
u(p)l(p, a(p)),
∑
p∈X
u(p)g(p, a(p))
)
, ∀p a(p) ∈ A
}
,
= {(H(u, f), G(u, f)), f is a mapping from X to A}.
Notice that F (u, y) does not depend on y, hence the value functions will not
depend on y. F has non empty values. Even with strong assumptions on l and g, F
may not have a compact graph, because in the definition of F (z) we have a unique
a(p) for each p. So even if q is close to p, the image by F of (1/2δp + 1/2δq, 0)
may be quite larger than F (δp, 0).
As in Renault, 2007, we denote by S(z0) = {s = (z1, ..., zt, ...) ∈ Z
∞, ∀t ≥
1, zt ∈ F (zt−1)} the set of plays at z0. The next proposition shows the strong
links between the stochastic game Γ(u) and the MDP Ψ(z0).
Proposition 2.40. a) For every Markov strategy σ in ΣM , there exists a play
s = (z1, ..., zt, ...) ∈ S(z0) such that ∀t ≥ 1, γ
u
[t](σ) = r(zt).
b) Reciprocally, for every play s = (z1, ..., zt, ...) ∈ S(z0), there exists a Markov
strategy σ in ΣM such that : ∀t ≥ 1, γu[t](σ) = r(zt).
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Proof : a) Take a Markov strategy σ = (σt)t≥1 in Σ
M . Put u1 = u and y0 = 0,
so that z0 = (u1, y0). Define by induction, for every t ≥ 1, ut+1 = H(ut, σt),
yt = G(ut, σt), and zt = (ut+1, yt) ∈ F (zt−1). s = (zt)t≥1 is a play at z0.
γu[1](σ) = G(u, σ1) = y1 = r(z1), and for t ≥ 2, γ
u
[t](σ) = γ
H(u,σ1)
[t−1] (σ
+) =
γu2[t−1](σ
+) = γu3[t−2](σ
++) = ... = γut[1]((σt′)t′≥t) = G(ut, σt) = yt = r(zt).
b) Take a play s = (zt)t≥1 at z0. Write for each t ≥ 0, zt = (ut+1, yt) ∈ ∆f (X)×
[0, 1]. For every t ≥ 1, there exists a mapping ft from X to A which defines
zt = (ut+1, yt) in terms of zt−1, i.e. that ut+1 = H(ut, ft), and yt = G(ut, ft).
Simply define σ = (ft)t≥1. As in point a), one can check that γ
u
[1](σ) = r(zt) for
each positive t. 
For any m ≥ 0, n ≥ 1, and s = (zt)t≥1 in Z
∞, we put as in definitions 3.1.
3.2. of Renault, 2007 :
γm,n(s) =
1
n
∑n
t=1 r(zm+t),
νm,n(s) = min{γm,t(s), t ∈ {1, ..., n}},
vm,n(z0) = sups∈S(z0)γm,n(s), and
wm,n(z0) = sups∈S(z0)νm,n(s).
By proposition 2.40 and corollary 2.29, it is easy to obtain for every m and
n, the equality of the values in the stochastic game Γ(u) and in the MDP Ψ(z0) :
v˜m,n(u) = vm,n(z0). As a consequence, we also have v
∗(u) = infn≥1supm≥0v˜m,n(u) =
v∗(z0) (see definitions 3.6 of Renault, 2007 and 2.25 here). Similarly, we have
wm,n(z0) = supσ∈ΣM min{γ
u
m,t(σ), t ∈ {1, .., n}} = wm,n(u) (see definition 2.31).
Define now vM(u) as the maximal quantity that can be guaranteed by player
1 in Γ(u) with Markov strategies :
vM(u) = supσ∈ΣM lim inf
n
(infτ∈T γ
u
n(σ, τ)) = supσ∈ΣM lim inf
n
γu0,n(σ).
Recall that the lower value of the MDP is defined by :
v(z0) = sup(zt)t≥1∈S(z0)
(
lim infn
1
n
∑n
t=1 r(zt)
)
. Again, proposition 2.40 gives
the equality vM(u) = v(z0), so that we have the following relations :
v(z0) = v
M(u) ≤ v(u) ≤ lim infN v˜N(u) = lim infN vN(z0)
≤ lim supN vN(z0) = lim supN v˜N(u) ≤ v(u) ≤ v
∗(u) = v∗(z0).
We can now conclude. We use the Wasserstein distance on ∆f (X), so Z na-
turally is a precompact metric space. For every m and n, by corollary 2.38,
(u 7→ wm,n(u)) is a non expansive mapping from ∆f (X) to [0, 1]. This implies that
(z0 7→ wm,n(z0)) is a non expansive mapping from Z to [0, 1]. As a consequence
the family (wm,n)m≥0,n≥1 is uniformly continuous. By corollary 3.8 of Renault,
2007, we obtain that the MDP Ψ(z0) has a uniform value which is :
v∗(z0) = v(z0) = limNvN(z0) = supm≥0infn≥1wm,n(z0) = supm≥0infn≥1vm,n(z0).
And the convergence from (vn) to v
∗ is uniform. Back to our stochastic game
Γ(u), we obtain that (vn)n uniformly converges to v
∗, and
v∗(u) = vM(u) = v(u) = limN v˜N(u) = v(u).
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So v(u) = v(u), which implies that Γ(u) has a uniform value. Moreover, v∗(u) =
supm≥0infn≥1wm,n(u) = supm≥0infn≥1v˜m,n(u), and using definition 3.6 of Renault,
2007, v∗(u) = infn≥1 supm≥0wm,n(u) = infn≥1supm≥0v˜m,n(u). This concludes the
proof of theorem 2.16.
   
2.4 Comments.
Remark 2.41. Player 2 has 0-optimal strategies.
Under the same hypotheses H1,..., H6, it is possible to slightly modify the proof
of Proposition 2.23 and obtain that player 2 has a Markov strategy τ which is 0-
optimal in Γ(u), i.e. such that : ∀ε > 0, ∃N0, ∀N ≥ N0, ∀σ ∈ Σ, γ
u
N(σ, τ) ≤ v+ ε.
Divide the set of stages into consecutive blocks B1,..., Bm,..., such that Bm has
cardinal m for each m. By lemma 2.22, there exists a Markov strategy τ = (τt)t≥1
with the property that for every m > 0, τ plays optimally within Bm, in the sense
that τ is an optimal strategy for player 2 in Γm(m−1)/2,m(u). For every strategy σ
of player 1, we have :
∀m ≥ 1, IEIPu,σ,τ

 1
m(m+ 1)/2
max(Bm)∑
t=1
g(pt, at, bt)

 ≤ 1
m
m∑
i=1
v˜i(i−1)/2,i(u).
We have seen in subsubsection 2.3.4 that the values in the stochastic game Γ(u)
are the values of the MDP Ψ(z0), so we can apply lemma 3.4 of Renault, 2007 :
∀i ≥ 1, ∀k ≥ 1, v˜i(i−1)/2,i(u) ≤ supl≥0wl,k(u) +
k−1
i
.
Fix now ε > 0. One can find k such that supl≥0wl,k(u) ≤ v
∗(u) + ε. Since
k−1
i
−→i→∞ 0, one can find m0 such that for every m ≥ m0,
IEIPu,σ,τ

 1
m(m+ 1)/2
max(Bm)∑
t=1
g(pt, at, bt)

 ≤ 1
m
m∑
i=1
(
v∗(u) + ε+
k − 1
i
)
≤ v∗(u)+2ε.
Looking at the size of the blocks, one can show that τ is 0-optimal for player 2. 
Remark 2.42. A simple hypothesis implying H5.
Recall that hypothesis H5 requires the existence of some subset D of E1 which
contains Φ(1, 0), and is stable under any Φ(α, .). The following hypothesis is sta-
ted in terms of the mappings g and l. The distance d on X is extended to ∆(X)
by the Wasserstein distance.
Hypothesis H5’ : ∀p ∈ X, ∀a ∈ A, ∀p′ ∈ X, ∃a′ ∈ A such that :
d(l(p, a), l(p′, a′)) ≤ d(p, p′), and infb∈Bg(p
′, a′, b) ≥ infb∈Bg(p, a, b)− d(p, p
′).
It is easy to check that H5’ implies that E1 itself is stable under any Φ(α, .)
so H5’ implies H5. Consequently, the conclusions of theorem 2.16 are true if
H1,H2,H3,H4,H5’,H6, H7 hold.
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3 Repeated games with an informed controller
3.1 Model
We first consider a general model of zero-sum repeated game. We have :
• five non empty finite sets : a set of states or parameters K, a set
I of actions for player 1, a set J of actions for player 2, a set C of
signals for player 1 and a set D of signals for player 2.
• an initial distribution pi ∈ ∆(K × C ×D),
• a mapping g from K × I × J to [0, 1], called the payoff function of
player 1, and
• a mapping q from K× I×J to ∆(K×C×D), called the transition
function.
Initially, (k1, c1, d1) is selected according to pi, player 1 learns c1 and player 2
learns d1. Then simultaneously player 1 chooses i1 in I and player 2 chooses j1
in J . The payoff for player 1 is g(k1, i1, j1), then (k2, c2, d2) is selected accor-
ding to q(k1, i1, j1), etc... At any stage t ≥ 2, (kt, ct, dt) is selected according to
q(kt−1, it−1, jt−1), player 1 learns ct and player 2 learns dt. Simultaneously, player
1 chooses it in I and player 2 chooses jt in J . The stage payoffs are g(kt, it, jt) for
player 1 and the opposite for player 2, and the play proceeds to stage t+ 1.
From now on we fix Γ = (K, I, J, C,D, g, q), and for every pi in ∆(K × C ×
D) we denote by Γ(pi) = (K, I, J, C,D, pi, g, q) the corresponding repeated game
induced by pi. For the moment we make no assumption on Γ, so we have a general
model including stochastic games, repeated games with incomplete information
and imperfect monitoring (signals). We start with elementary definitions and
notations.
Players are allowed to select their actions randomly. A (behavior) strategy
for player 1 is a sequence σ = (σt)t≥1, where for each t, σt is a mapping from
(C × I)t−1 × C to ∆(I), with the interpretation that σt(c1, i1, ..., ct−1, it−1, ct) is
the lottery on actions used by player 1 at stage n after (c1, i1, ..., ct−1, it−1, ct).
σ1 is just a mapping from C to ∆(I) giving the first action played by player 1
depending on his initial signal. Similarly, a strategy for player 2 is a sequence
τ = (τt)t≥1, where for each t, τt is a mapping from (D × J)
t−1 ×D to ∆(J). We
denote by Σ and T the sets of strategies of player 1 and player 2, respectively.
It is standard that a pair of strategies (σ, τ) induces a probability IPpi,σ,τ on
the set of plays Ω = (K×C×D×I×J)∞, endowed with the σ-algebra generated
by the cylinders.
Definition 3.1. The payoff for player 1 induced by (σ, τ) at the first N stages is
denoted by :
γpiN(σ, τ) = IEIPpi,σ,τ
(
1
N
N∑
n=1
g(kn, in, jn)
)
.
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For pi in ∆(K × C × D) and N ≥ 1, the N -stage game game ΓN(pi) is the
zero-sum game with normal form (Σ, T , γpiN). By Kuhn ’s theorem, ΓN (pi) can be
seen as the mixed extension of a finite game, so it has a value vn(pi).
The following definitions are similar to those of subsection 2.1 or section 2 of
Renault, 2007.
Definition 3.2. Let pi be in ∆(K × C ×D).
The liminf value of Γ(pi) is : v−(pi) = lim inf
n
vn(pi).
The limsup value of Γ(pi) is : v+(pi) = lim sup
n
vn(pi).
The lower (or maxmin) value of Γ(pi) is :
v(pi) = supσ∈Σ lim inf
n
(infτ∈T γ
pi
n(σ, τ)) .
The upper (or minmax) value of Γ(u) is :
v(pi) = infτ∈T lim sup
n
(supσ∈Σγ
pi
N(σ, τ)) .
We have v(pi) ≤ v−(pi) ≤ v+(pi) ≤ v(pi).
Γ(pi) is said to have a uniform value if and only if v(pi) = v(pi), and in this case
the uniform value is v(pi) = v(pi).
An equivalent definition of the uniform value is as follows. Given a real number
v, we say that player 1 can guarantee v in Γ(pi) if : ∀ε > 0, ∃σ ∈ Σ, ∃N0, ∀N ≥
N0, ∀τ ∈ T , γ
pi
N(σ, τ) ≥ v − ε. Player 2 can guarantee v in Γ(pi) if : ∀ε > 0, ∃τ ∈
T , ∃N0, ∀N ≥ N0, ∀σ ∈ Σ, γ
pi
N(σ, τ) ≤ v+ε. If player 1 can guarantee v and player
2 can guarantee w then clearly w ≥ v. We also have, exactly as in claim 2.6 :
Claim 3.3. v(pi) = max{v ∈ IR, player 1 can guarantee v in Γ(pi) },
v(pi) = min{v ∈ IR, player 2 can guarantee v in Γ(pi) }.
A real number v can be guaranteed by both players if and only if v is the
uniform value of Γ(pi).
We now consider hypotheses on q and pi.
Hypothesis HA : Player 1 is informed of everything, i.e. at any stage t ≥ 1, he
can deduce from his signal ct : the state kt, player 2’s signal dt, and if t ≥ 2, he
can also deduce from ct the action jt−1 previously played by player 2.
Hypothesis HB : Player 1 fully controls the transition, i.e. q(k, i, j) does not
depend on j for each (k, i) in K × I.
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HA and HB are very strong hypotheses, and they are incompatible as soon as
J has several elements. We will use weaker hypotheses.
Hypothesis HA’ : Player 1 is informed, in the sense that he can always deduce
the state and player 2’s signal from his own signal. Formally, there exists two
mappings kˆ : C −→ K and dˆ : C −→ D such that, if E denotes {(k, c, d) ∈
K × C ×D, kˆ(c) = k and dˆ(c) = d}, then :
pi(E) = 1, and q(k, i, j)(E) = 1, ∀(k, i, j) ∈ K × I × J.
Notice that HA’ does not mean that player 1 knows everything. Since we did
not include the signals in the move, knowing the signal dt of player 2 at some
stage t does not imply knowing the action jt by player 2. However, not knowing
this action will not be a problem for player 1 because we will also assume that
player 2 does not really influence the transitions.
Hypothesis HB’ : Player 1 controls the transition, in the sense that the margi-
nal of the transition q on K ×D does not depend on player 2’s action. For k in
K, i in I and j in J , we denote by q¯(k, i) the marginal of q(k, i, j) on K ×D.
Assume that HA’ and HB’ hold. The couple (new state, signal of player 2)
is selected according to a distribution depending on the current state and player
1’s action, but not depending on player 2’s action. Player 2 may influence the
distribution of player 1’s signal, but still player 1 will be able to deduce the state
and player 2’s new information on the state. So essentially player 2 can influence
player 1’s knowledge about player 2’s action. But this information is not relevant
because it does not affect player 2’s belief on the future states.
Theorem 3.4. Under the hypotheses HA’ and HB’, the repeated game Γ(pi) has
a uniform value.
The next subsection is devoted to the proof of theorem 3.4. See subsection 3.3
for other comments on hypotheses, applications and open questions.
3.2 Proof of theorem 3.4
We assume in this subsection that HA’ and HB’ are satisfied. Keeping fixed
all other quantities, increasing the set C of signals for player 1 has no influence
on the existence of the uniform value, so in the sequel we will assume w.l.o.g.
that : The mapping ( c −→ (kˆ(c), dˆ(c)) ) is a surjection from C to K ×D.
We put X = ∆(K). An element u in ∆f (X) is written u =
∑
p∈X u(p)δp. As
in the previous section, we use the Wasserstein distance, and the (reverse of ) the
Choquet order on ∆(X). ∀u ∈ ∆(X), ∀v ∈ ∆(X), d(u, v) = supf :E→IR,1−Lip|u(f)−
v(f)|. And we write u  v iif for every continuous concave real valued mapping
f defined on X , u(f) ≥ v(f).
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If S is a finite set, we use the norm ‖.‖1 on IR
S . The set of probability distri-
butions ∆(S) is viewed4 as a subset of IRS .
3.2.1 Value of finite games.
As in definition 2.19, we need to consider a large family of finite games.
Definition 3.5. Let θ =
∑
t≥1 θtδt be in ∆f(IN
∗), i.e. θ is a probability with finite
support over positive integers. For pi in ∆(K × C × D), the game Γ[θ](pi) is the
game with normal form (Σ, T , γpi[θ]), where :
γpi[θ](σ, τ) = IEIPpi,σ,τ
(∑
t≥1
θt g(kt, it, jt)
)
.
Particular cases : if θ = 1/n
∑n
t=1 δt, Γ[θ](pi) is nothing but Γn(pi).
For m ≥ 0 and n ≥ 1, we denote by Γm,n(pi) the game Γ[θ](pi) where θ =
1/n
∑m+n
t=m+1 δt. The payoff function is written in this case : γ
pi
m,n(σ, τ). The value
of Γm,n(pi) will be denoted by vm,n(pi).
Notice that v0,n is just vn, the value of the n-stage game. The following lemma
is true without the hypotheses HA′ and HB′.
Lemma 3.6. For every θ ∈ ∆f (IN
∗) and pi ∈ ∆(K×C×D), the game Γ[θ](pi) has
a value, denoted by v[θ](pi), and both players have optimal strategies. Moreover,
v[θ] is a non expansive mapping from ∆(K × C ×D) to IR.
Proof : The existence of the value and optimal strategies is standard. Notice
that for every θ, pi, and strategy pair (σ, τ) :
γpi[θ](σ, τ) =
∑
k1,c1,d1
pi(k1, c1, d1) γ
δ(k1,c1,d1)
[θ] (σ, τ).
Since we use ‖.‖1, v[θ] is 1-Lipschitz. 
Definition 3.7. We define a mapping Ψ from ∆(K × D) to ∆f (X) by : for
each probability pi on K ×D, Ψ(pi) =
∑
d∈D pi(d)δpid, where for each d, pi
d is the
conditional probability on K given d issued from pi.
Notation 3.8. Let pi be in ∆(K × C × D). We denote by p¯i the marginal of
pi on K × D, and denote by pˆi the probability induced by pi (or p¯i) on X, i.e.
pˆi = Ψ(p¯i) =
∑
d∈D pi(d)δpid ∈ ∆f (X), where for each d, pi
d is the conditional
probability on K given d issued from pi (or p¯i).
We also put ∆E = {pi ∈ ∆(K × C × D), pi(E) = 1}, where E = {(k, c, d) ∈
K × C ×D, kˆ(c) = k and dˆ(c) = d}.
4Notice that if we put d(s, s′) = 2 for any distinct elements of S, then for every p and q in
∆(S) we have supf :S→IR,1−Lip|
∑
s p
sf(s)−
∑
s q
sf(s)| = ‖p− q‖1.
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Lemma 3.9. Let pi and pi′ be in ∆E such that pˆi = pi′. Then v[θ](pi) = v[θ](pi
′) for
each θ.
Proof : Fix θ in ∆f(IN
∗), pi in ∆E , and a strategy pair (σ, τ).
γpi[θ](σ, τ) =
∑
d1
pi(d1)
∑
k1
pi(k1|d1)
∑
c1
pi(c1|d1, k1) γ
δ(k1,c1,d1)
[θ] (σ, τ).
Since pi(E) = 1, player 1 can deduce d1 and k1 from c1, so :
supσ∈Σγ
pi
[θ](σ, τ) =
∑
d1
pi(d1)
∑
k1
pi(k1|d1)
∑
c1
pi(c1|d1, k1) supσ∈Σγ
δ(k1,c1,d1)
[θ] (σ, τ).
But supσ∈Σγ
δ(k1,c1,d1)
[θ] (σ, τ) does not depend on c1, so for any fixed c
∗ in C,
supσ∈Σγ
pi
[θ](σ, τ) =
∑
d1
pi(d1)
∑
k1
pi(k1|d1) supσ∈Σγ
δ(k1,c∗,d1)
[θ] (σ, τ).
Consequently, supσ∈Σγ
pi
[θ](σ, τ) only depends on pˆi, τ and θ, and v[θ](pi) = infτ∈T
supσ∈Σγ
pi
[θ](σ, τ) only depends on pˆi and θ. 
Remember that we assumed w.l.o.g. that the function (kˆ, dˆ) appearing in
hypothesis HA’ is surjective. It will be convenient in the sequel to use the following
notation.
Notation 3.10. For any (k, d) in K × D, we fix an element c(k, d) in C such
that kˆ(c(k, d)) = k and dˆ(c(k, d)) = d.
v[θ] has been defined as a mapping from ∆(K ×C ×D) to IR. We now define
value functions with domain X and ∆(X). Let p be in X . We define pi in ∆E as
follows : fix d∗ in D, and pi chooses, for each k in K, the element (k, c(k, d∗), d∗)
with probability pk. Then pˆi = δp, so by the previous lemma v[θ](pi) only depends
on p. We thus define :
v[θ](p) = v[θ](pi).
With a slight abuse of notation, v[θ] now also denotes a mapping from ∆(K) to
IR. And we have for each pi in ∆E :
v[θ](pi) = infτ∈T supσ∈Σγ
pi
[θ](σ, τ),
=
∑
d1∈D
pi(d1) infτ∈T
(∑
k1
pi(k1|d1) supσ∈Σγ
δ(k1,c∗,d1)
[θ] (σ, τ)
)
,
=
∑
d1∈D
pi(d1)v[θ](pi
d1).
So we have obtained the following.
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Lemma 3.11.
∀pi ∈ ∆E , ∀θ ∈ ∆f (IN
∗), v[θ](pi) =
∑
d1∈D
pi(d1)v[θ](pi
d1).
Notation 3.12. v˜[θ] denotes the affine extension of v[θ] on ∆(X), i.e. : ∀u ∈
∆(X), v˜[θ](u) =
∫
p∈X
v[θ](p)du(p).
From the previous computations, v˜[θ] is clearly linked to the original value
function v[θ].
Claim 3.13.
∀pi ∈ ∆E, v[θ](pi) = v˜[θ](pˆi).
So from the knowledge of v[θ] on X , one can deduce its extension v˜[θ] on ∆(X)
and then the original value function v[θ] on ∆
E . We have, for each p in ∆(K) (and
for any d∗ in D) :
v[θ](p) = infτ∈T
(∑
k1
pk1 supσ∈Σ γ
δ(k1,c(k,d∗),d∗)
[θ] (σ, τ)
)
. So v[θ] is a concave and
non expansive mapping from ∆(K) to IR. Consequently, v˜[θ] is a non decreasing
and non expansive mapping from ∆(X) to IR.
We finally define :
Definition 3.14. For pi in ∆(K × C ×D), we put :
v∗(pi) = infn≥1 supm≥0 vm,n(pi).
3.2.2 An auxiliary stochastic game.
We now introduce a stochastic game with complete information, to be played
in pure strategies, as in section 2.
Definition 3.15. Recall that X = ∆(K). We put A = ∆(I)K and B = ∆(J),
and define for every p in X, a in A and b in B :
g(p, a, b) =
∑
k∈K
pk
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
ak(i)b(j)g(k, i, j),
g(p, a) = infb∈Bg(p, a, b),
Q(p, a, b) =
∑
(k,i,j)∈K×I×J
pkak(i)b(j)q(k, i, j) ∈ ∆(K × C ×D),
Q¯(p, a) =
∑
(k,i)∈K×I
pkak(i)q¯(k, i) ∈ ∆(K ×D),
l(p, a) = Ψ(Q¯(p, a)).
g is a mapping from X ×A×B to [0, 1], whereas l is a mapping from X ×A to
∆f(X).
For u in ∆f (X), we write Γˆ(u) for the stochastic game (X,A,B, g, l, u) with
initial distribution u.
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By hypothesis HB’, it is easy to see that the marginal ofQ(p, a, b) on ∆(K×D)
does not depend on b, and precisely is Q¯(p, a). l(p, a) is nothing but∑
d∈D Q¯(p, a)(d) δQ¯(p,a)d, where for each d, Q¯(p, a)
d is the conditional probability
on K given d issued from Q¯(p, a). Notice also that for every (p, a, b), Q(p, a, b)
belongs to the convex set ∆E .
Suppose that in the original game Γ(pi), the current state is selected according
to p, player 1 knows k and plays the mixed action ak ∈ ∆(I), whereas player 2
just knows p and plays the mixed action b ∈ ∆(J). Then g(p, a, b) is the (ex-ante)
expected payoff for player 1, and l(p, a) is the (ex-ante) distribution of player 2’s
future belief on the next state.
We will eventually apply theorem 2.16 to Γˆ(pˆi), so we have to check the hypo-
theses H1 to H7 of section 2. H1, H2, H3 and H4 are clearly true. We now need
the following properties of the mapping Ψ.
Lemma 3.16. Ψ is concave :
∀pi′, pi′′ ∈ ∆(K ×D), ∀λ ∈ [0, 1], Ψ(λpi′ + (1− λ)pi′′)  λΨ(pi′) + (1− λ)Ψ(pi′′).
Proof :Write pi = λpi′+(1−λ)pi′′. Notice that for each d inD, pid = 1
pi(d)
(λpi′(d)pi′d+
(1− λ)pi′′(d)pi′′d). Let f be a concave continuous mapping from X to IR, we have
to show that Ψ(pi)(f) ≥ λΨ(pi′)(f) + (1− λ)Ψ(pi′′)(f).
λΨ(pi′)(f) + (1− λ)Ψ(pi′′)(f) = λ
∑
d
pi′(d)f(pi′d) + (1− λ)
∑
d
pi′′(d)f(pi′′d),
=
∑
d
pi(d)
(
λpi′(d)
pi(d)
f(pi′d) +
(1− λ)pi′′(d)
pi(d)
f(pi′′(d)
)
,
≤
∑
d
pi(d)f
(
λpi′(d)
pi(d)
pi′d +
(1− λ)pi′′(d)
pi(d)
pi′′(d)
)
,
=
∑
d
pi(d)f(pid) = Ψ(pi)(f). 
For any p in X , the marginal Q¯(p, a) is affine in a, so we obtain that l(p, a) =
Ψ(Q¯(p, a)) is concave in a. Hypothesis H6 will then immediately follow from the
next lemma.
Lemma 3.17. Ψ is continuous.
Proof : Let (pin)n be a sequence in ∆(K ×D) converging for the norm ‖.‖1 to pi.
It is easy to see that for every f continuous, Ψ(pin)(f) =
∑
d pin(d)f(pi
d
n) converges
as n goes to infinity to
∑
d pi(d)f(pi
d) = Ψ(pi)(f). 
Remark 3.18. One can show that Ψ is Lipschitz, but it is not 1-Lipschitz when
‖.‖1 and the Wasserstein distance are used.
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Lemma 3.19. “Splitting hypothesis” H7. Consider a convex combination p =∑S
s=1 λsps in X, and a family of actions (as)s∈S in A
S. Then there exists a in A
such that :
l(p, a) 
∑
s∈S
λsl(ps, as) and g(p, a) ≥
∑
s∈S
λsg(ps , as).
Proof : Define a : K −→ ∆(I) with the well known splitting procedure of
Aumann and Maschler : observe k in K which has been selected according to
p, then choose s with probability λsp
k
s/p
k, and finally play aks . Formally, put
ak =
∑
s∈S
λspks
pk
aks ∈ ∆(I) if p
k > 0, and define arbitrarily ak if pk = 0. We have :
Q¯(p, a) =
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈I
pkak(i)q¯(k, i),
=
∑
s∈S
∑
k∈K
∑
i∈I
λsp
k
sa
k
s(i)q¯(k, i),
=
∑
s∈S
λsQ¯(ps, as)
So by concavity of Ψ, we have l(p, a) 
∑
s λsl(ps, as).
Regarding payoffs, we have for each b in B, g(p, a, b) =
∑
s λsg(ps, as, b), so
infb∈Bg(p, a, b) ≥
∑
s∈S λsinfb∈Bg(ps, as, b). 
Up to now, only H5 remains to be proved.
3.2.3 The recursive formula.
We now prove a standard recursive formula for the value functions. As in
definition 2.19, for θ =
∑
t≥1 θtδt we define θ
+ as the law of t∗ − 1 given that
t∗ ≥ 2, so that θ+ =
∑
t≥1
θt+1
1−θ1
δt if θ1 6= 1, and θ
+ is defined arbitrarily if θ1 = 1.
Proposition 3.20. For θ in ∆f(IN
∗) and p in X,
v[θ](p) = max
a∈A
min
b∈B
(
θ1g(p, a, b) + (1− θ1)v˜[θ+](l(p, a))
)
,
= min
b∈B
max
a∈A
(
θ1g(p, a, b) + (1− θ1)v˜[θ+](l(p, a))
)
.
For every pi in ∆E, in the game Γ[θ](pi) both players have optimal strategies only
depending on p¯i ∈ ∆(K ×D).
Proof : By the proof of lemma 3.9, we know that for any τ in T and fixed c∗ in
C,
supσ∈Σγ
pi
[θ](σ, τ) =
∑
d1
pi(d1)
∑
k1
pi(k1|d1) supσ∈Σγ
δ(k1,c∗,d1)
[θ] (σ, τ).
And τ is optimal in Γ[θ](pi) if and only if
∑
d1
pi(d1)
∑
k1
pi(k1|d1) supσ∈Σγ
δ(k1,c∗,d1)
[θ] (σ, τ)
=
∑
d1
pi(d1)infτ ′∈T
∑
k1
pi(k1|d1) supσ∈Σγ
δ(k1,c∗,d1)
[θ] (σ, τ
′). Hence player 2 has an op-
timal strategy in Γ[θ](pi) that only depends on p¯i.
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We now show that player 1 has an optimal strategy in Γ[θ](pi) that only de-
pends on p¯i. For every d1 in D, fix an optimal strategy σ(d1) of player 1 in the
game Γ[θ]
(∑
k1∈K
pi(k1|d1)δ(k1,c(k1,d1),d1)
)
. Define now σ that plays after each ini-
tial signal c1 exactly what σ(dˆ(c1)) plays after the initial signal c(kˆ(c1), dˆ(c1)).
One can check that σ is optimal in any game Γ[θ](pi
′), if pi′ ∈ ∆E and pi′ = p¯i.
We now prove the recursive formula by induction on the greatest element in
the support of θ. v1(p) = maxa∈Aminb∈B g(p, a, b) = minb∈B maxa∈A g(p, a, b) is
easy by Sion’s theorem.
Fix now n ≥ 2, and assume that the proposition is true for every θ with
support included in {1, ..., n − 1}. Fix a probability θ =
∑n
t=1 θtδt, and notice
that θ+ has a support included in {1, ..., n − 1}. Fix also p in X . The equality
maxa∈Aminb∈B (θ1g(p, a, b)+(1−θ1)v˜[θ+](l(p, a))) = minb∈B maxa∈A (θ1g(p, a, b)+
(1 − θ1)v˜[θ+](l(p, a))) is standard and similar to the proof of proposition 2.20, so
the proof is omitted here.
By definition, we have v[θ](p) = v[θ](pi), where pi =
∑
k p
kδ(k,c(k,d∗),d∗) ∈ ∆(K×
C ×D), and d∗ is an arbitrary element of D. We thus consider the game Γ[θ](pi).
Let (σ, τ) be a strategy pair. Write a = (ak)k = (σ1(c(k, d
∗)))k in A = ∆(I)
K for
the action played by player 1 at stage 1, and write b = τ1(d
∗) ∈ B = ∆(J) for
the first stage action of player 2. We have :
γpi[θ](σ, τ) = θ1g(p, a, b) + (1− θ1)
∑
k,i1,j1
pkak(i1)b(j1)γ
q(k,i1,j1)
[θ+] (σ
+
c(k,d∗),i1
, τ+d∗,j1),
where σ+c(k,d∗),i1 and τ
+
d∗,j1
are continuation strategies.
a being fixed, we can choose σ+ an optimal strategy for player 1 in the
game Γ[θ+](Q(p, a, j1)), and this choice can be made independently of j1 since
the marginal Q¯(p, a, j1) does not depend on j1. We have for every j1 in J :∑
k,i1
pkak(i1)γ
q(k,i1,j1)
[θ+] (σ
+, τ+d∗,j1) = γ
Q(p,a,j1)
[θ+] (σ
+, τ+d∗,j1) ≥ v[θ+](Q(p, a, j1)) =
v˜[θ+](l(p, a)). By playing a at stage 1, and then according to σ
+ (for any first signal
c(k, d∗) and first action i1), player 1 can thus guarantee : infbθ1g(p, a, b) + (1 −
θ1)v˜[θ+](l(p, a)). So v[θ](p) ≥ maxa∈Aminb∈B(θ1g(p, a, b)+ (1− θ1)v˜[θ+](l(p, a))).
We finally show that player 2 can defend maxa∈Aminb∈B(θ1g(p, a, b) +(1 −
θ1)v˜[θ+](l(p, a))) in Γ[θ](pi). Fix a strategy σ of player 1. a = (σ1(c(k, d
∗)))k being
fixed, choose b in B achieving infbg(p, a, b). We also choose τ
+ in T an optimal
strategy for player 2 in the game Γ[θ+](Q(p, a, j1)), and this choice can be made
independently of j1. τ
+ now being fixed, notice that there exists a strategy σ′ of
player 1 which is a best reply to τ+ in any game Γ[θ+](pi
′), with pi′ ∈ ∆E . We now
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have :
γpi[θ](σ, τ) = θ1g(p, a, b) + (1− θ1)
∑
j1
b(j1)
∑
k,i1
pkak(i1)γ
q(k,i1,j1)
[θ+] (σ
+
c(k,d∗),i1
, τ+),
≤ θ1g(p, a) + (1− θ1)
∑
j1
b(j1)
∑
k,i1
pkak(i1)γ
q(k,i1,j1)
[θ+] (σ
′, τ+),
= θ1g(p, a) + (1− θ1)
∑
j1
b(j1)γ
Q(p,a,j1)
[θ+] (σ
′, τ+),
= θ1g(p, a) + (1− θ1)
∑
j1
b(j1)v[θ+](l(p, a)),
≤ supa∈A
(
θ1g(p, a) + (1− θ1)v˜[θ+](l(p, a))
)
So v[θ](p) ≤ maxa∈Aminb∈B
(
θ1g(p, a, b) + (1− θ1)v˜[θ+](l(p, a))
)
. 
3.2.4 Player 2 can guarantee v∗(pi) in Γ(pi).
We first have an analog of lemma 2.22. Recall that a strategy for player 2 is a
sequence τ = (τ1, τ2, ..., τt, ...), where for each t, τt is a mapping from (D×J)
t−1×D
to ∆(J).
Lemma 3.21. For every pi ∈ ∆E, n ≥ 1 and m ≥ 0, ∀τ1, ..., τm, ∃τm+1, ..., τm+n
such that any strategy of player 2 starting by τ1, ..., τm, ..., τm+n is optimal in the
game Γm,n(pi).
Proof : Fix pi, m, n, and τ1, ..., τm, with τt : (D× J)
t−1 ×D −→ ∆(J) for every
t ≤ m. Define T † as the set of strategies of player 2 that start with τ1,...,τm.
Let us now consider the zero-sum game Γ†m,n(pi) with strategy set Σ for player
1, T † for player 2, and payoff function (the restriction of) vm,n. Stages greater
than m + n do not care, so Γ†m,n(pi) can be seen as the mixed extension of a
finite game, where nature plays τ1, ..., τm instead of player 2 for the first m
stages. Consequently, Γ†m,n(pi) has a value which we denote by v
†
m,n(pi). Clearly,
v†m,n(pi) ≥ vm,n(pi). Now, for any strategy σ of player 1, it is easy to construct,
by the recursive formula of proposition 3.20, a strategy τ that defends vm,n(pi)
against σ. So v†m,n(pi) = vm,n(pi), and considering an optimal strategy of player 2
in Γ†m,n(pi) concludes the proof. 
Proposition 3.22. For each pi in ∆E, player 2 can guarantee v∗(pi) in the game
Γ(pi).
Proof : Divide the set of stages into consecutive blocks B1, B2,..., Bm of equal
length n. Define a strategy τ of player 2 as follows. At block B1, pick τ1, τ2, ..., τn
in order to get an optimal strategy in Γ0,n(pi). At block B
2, use lemma 3.21 to
construct τn+1, ..., τ2n and get an optimal strategy also in Γn,n(pi), etc... At block
Bm+1, given τ1,...,τnm, use lemma 3.21 to define τnm+1,..., τn(m+1) to get an optimal
strategy in Γnm,n(pi).
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For any σ and M ≥ 1, we have :
IEIPpi,σ,τ
(
1
Mn
∑Mn
t=1 g(kt, it, jt)
)
≤ 1
M
∑M−1
m=0 v˜mn,n(pi) ≤ supmv˜m,n(pi). So player
2 can guarantee v∗(pi). 
We now have the following inequality chain, for pi in ∆E :
v(pi) ≤ v−(pi) ≤ v+(pi) ≤ v(pi) ≤ v∗(pi).
3.2.5 Player 1 can guarantee v∗(pi) via the auxiliary game.
For f continuous and α in [0, 1], we defined in notation 2.13 the mapping
Φ(α, f) as follows : ∀p ∈ X,
Φ(α, f)(p) = supa∈Ainfb∈B
(
α g(p, a, b) + (1− α) f˜(l(p, a))
)
.
We now simply define the following subset of mappings from X to IR :
D = {v[θ], θ ∈ ∆f (IN
∗)}.
By the recursive formula, we obtain that D is stable under Φ : ∀f ∈ D, ∀α ∈ [0, 1],
Φ(α, f) ∈ D. Since v1 = Φ(1, 0) ∈ D and all elements of D are non expansive,
the hypothesis H5 of section 2 is satisfied.
Proposition 3.23.
a) For every u in ∆f(X), the auxiliary game Γˆ(u) = (X,A,B, g, l, u) satisfies
the hypotheses H1,..., H7 of theorem 2.16.
b) For every θ in ∆f (IN
∗) and u in ∆f (X), the auxiliary game Γˆ[θ](u) defined
in definition 2.19 has a value which corresponds to v˜[θ](u), as defined in notation
3.12.
c) For pi in ∆E, anything that can be guaranteed by player 1 with Markov
strategies in Γˆ[θ](pˆi) can be guaranteed by player 1 in the original game Γ(pi).
Proof : a) H1,...,H7 have been proved. b) The equality between the value func-
tions of the original game and of the auxiliary game comes from propositions
2.20 and 3.20. c) A markov strategy of player 1 is a sequence (σt)t≥1, where for
each t σt is a mapping from X to A giving the action to be played on stage t de-
pending on the current state in X = ∆(K). It induces a probability distribution
on (X × A)∞, regardless of player 2’s actions (see subsection 2.3.3). Any such
strategy can be mimicked by player 1 in the original game, since this player can
compute at each stage the belief of player 2 on the state in K. 
Notice that the analog of point c) is not true regarding player 2, because in
the original game this player can compute posterior beliefs on K only if he knows
player 1’s strategy.
We can now conclude the proof of theorem 3.4. Fix pi in ∆E , and put u =
pˆi ∈ ∆f (X). For every θ, we have v[θ](pi) = v˜[θ](u) by proposition 3.23 b) and
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claim 3.13. So v∗(pi) = infnsupmvm,n(pi) = infnsupmv˜m,n(u) = v
∗(u). By theorem
2.16, (v˜n(u))n converges to v
∗(u), and player 1 can guarantee v∗(u) in Γˆ(u) with
a Markov strategy. So we obtain that (vn(pi))n converges to v
∗(pi), and player 1
can guarantee this quantity in the original game Γ(pi). Finally Γ(pi) has a uniform
value which is :
v(pi) = v−(pi) = v+(pi) = v(pi) = v∗(pi).
   
3.3 Comments and consequences
3.3.1 Byproducts of the proof.
The proof of theorem 3.4 shows, under the very same hypotheses HA’ and
HB’, more than the existence of the uniform value.
In particular, the application of theorem 2.16 to the auxiliary game gives :
v∗(pi) = infn≥1supm≥0vm,n(pi) = supm≥0infn≥1vm,n(pi),
= infn≥1supm≥0wm,n(pi) = supm≥0infn≥1wm,n(pi).
where vm,n(pi) is defined in definition 3.5, and wm,n(pi) = infθ∈∆({1,...,n})v[θm,n](pi)
(see definition 2.31 and corollary 2.38).
And (vn)n uniformly converges to v
∗ on ∆E .
Concerning ε-optimal strategies, we have seen that player 1 can guarantee
v∗(u) with Markov strategies, i.e. with strategies that play at each stage a mixed
action determined by player 2’s current belief on the current state of nature in
K.
Regarding player 2, one can strengthen the construction of proposition 3.22
and show as in remark 2.41 that player 2 has 0-optimal strategies in the game
Γ(pi). Notice that our proof does not tell if player 1 has 0-optimal strategies in
the game Γ(pi) (see example 5.7. in Renault, 2007). 
3.3.2 HA’ or HB’ can not be withdrawn in theorem 3.4.
An example of a game satisfying HA’ and having no uniform value is given in
Sorin, 1984. It is a particular case of a stochastic game with incomplete informa-
tion, where after each stage the players perfectly observe the actions just chosen.
(There are two possible stochastic games of “Big Match” type, and player 1 only
knows which one is being played.)
An example of a game satisfying HB’ and having no uniform value is given
in Sorin and Zamir, 1985. It belongs to a class of games called repeated games
with incomplete information on one and a half side : at each stage, both players
will play the same matrix game. Player 1 initially receives a signal which tells
him which matrix game will be played, but does not know the initial signal of
player 2, so can not deduce from his signal the belief of player 2 on the selected
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matrix game. The transition function q is particularly simple there : q(k, i, j) is
the Dirac measure on (k, j, i).
3.3.3 Applications.
Consider the following model of repeated games with standard monitoring.
There are : a finite set of states K, an initial probability p on ∆(K), finite action
sets I and J , for each state k a payoff matrix (Gk(i, j))(i,j), and for each state k
in K and action i in I there is a probability l(k, i) ∈ ∆(K). At stage 1, a state k1
is selected according to p and told to player 1 only. Then simultaneously player 1
chooses i1 in I and player 2 chooses j1 in J . The payoff for player 1 is G
k1(i1, j1),
and (i1, j1) is publicly announced. At stage t ≥ 2, kt is selected according to
l(kt−1, it−1) and told to player 1 only. Then the players choose it and jt. The
stage payoff for player 1 is Gkt(it, jt), (it, jt) is publicly announced, and the play
goes to stage t + 1.
This model is a generalization of the model of Markov chain repeated games
with lack of information on one side introduced in Renault, 2006. Here, player
1 is not only informed of the sequence of actions, but also he can influence the
state process. Studying this model has lead to the present paper, and some ideas
developed here already come from Renault 2006. It also contains stochastic games
with a single controller and incomplete information on the side of his opponent, as
studied in Rosenberg et al., 2004. So the present paper generalizes both theorem
2.3 in Renault 2006, and theorem 6 in Rosenberg et al. 2004, and as a consequence
it also generalizes the original existence result of Aumann and Maschler (1995)
for the value of (non stochastic) repeated games with incomplete information on
one side and perfect monitoring.
Notice that our result does not imply the existence of the value for models
when player 1 receives signals without having a perfect knowledge of the belief
of player 2 on the state (see Aumann Maschler 1995, or Zamir, 1992 for repeated
with lack of information on one side, or Neyman 2008 for Markov chain repeated
games with lack of information on one side). When the state is uncontrolled, more
flexibility on the signalling structure can be allowed.
3.3.4 Open problems.
1. We have seen that hypotheses HA’ and HB’ can not be withdrawn in theo-
rem 3.4. However, strengthening HB’ into HB may allow to weaken HA’ into the
following hypothesis.
Hypothesis HA” : Player 1 is more informed than player 2, i.e. there exists a
mapping dˆ : C −→ D such that : if E denotes {(k, c, d) ∈ K × C ×D, dˆ(c) = d},
we have : pi(E) = 1, and q(k, i, j)(E) = 1, ∀(k, i, j) ∈ K × I × J.
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If we only assume that HA” and HB’ hold, it may be the case that player 2
controls player 1’s signal, hence in some sense player 2 may “manipulate” player
1’s knowledge of the state. So our proof does not apply here, and in our opinion
most likely the value may fail to exist.
The situation is different if we assume HA” and HB. Player 1 always have
more information than player 2 about the state, but the set X = ∆(K) is not
sufficient to characterize, after each stage, the difference of information from
player 1 to player 2. The natural state space here may rather be the set {(u, v) ∈
∆f(X)×∆f(X), u  v}. Does the uniform value exist in this case ?
2. In general, recall that lemma 3.6 is true without hypotheses, so in particu-
lar the n stage values vn always exist. There is no known example of a zero-sum
repeated game (defined with finite data exactly as in subsection 3.1) where limnvn
does not exist.
3. Assume that player 1 always has more information than player 2, i.e. that
player 1 can deduce from his signal both the signal and the action of player 2.
This is the case, e.g., when HA holds. It has been conjectured by Mertens, Sorin
and Zamir (see Sorin, 2002, 6.5.8. p.147, or Mertens et al, 1994, Part C, p. 451)
that for such repeated games, the limit of (vn(pi))n exists and can be guaranteed
by player 1 in Γ(pi).
The approach used here might help to prove the conjecture. An important step
would be to obtain an analog of the result on dynamic programming (Renault,
2007) for two-player stochastic games with deterministic transitions and action-
independent payoffs. More precisely, let Z be a state space, A and B be action
sets, r be a payoff function from Z to [0, 1], and f be a transition from Z×A×B
to Z. At each stage, if the current state is z simultaneously player 1 chooses a
and player 2 chooses b. Player 1’s payoff is r(z), and (a, b) and the new state
f(z, a, b) are publicly announced. Z being a precompact metric space, can we
find “nice” uniform equicontinuity conditions on some auxiliary value functions
that will ensure the existence5 of the uniform value ?
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